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28 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NIE 11-3-60: SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1965

1. This estimate supersedes NIE 11-57. Its publication date was advanced from June to March at the request of the State Department so that it could be used in preparing briefing material for the President prior to the Summit conference. The Summary and Conclusions section of the paper is believed to be suitable for this purpose; the Discussion section is for use by lower level consumers who require considerable technical detail.

2. The major development since the last estimate on this subject has been the rapid and widespread deployment of the SA-2 missile system. Our estimates of its present and future deployment are based upon extensive research and analysis by ORR. These estimates have been accepted by the rest of the community, although Air Force does not agree with ORR's methodology.

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3. Only two dissents are now recorded in this estimate. The first of these (paragraph 8, page 4) reflects Army's view that the local air defense organization is subordinate to the local military or naval commander. In this Army is at odds with NSA and the rest of the community, who hold that the PVO Strany is a separate command on an equal footing with the ground, air, and naval forces, and that the local PVO commander has full operational control of the air defense forces in his district.

4. The other expressed dissent (paragraph 88, page 50) has to do with Soviet development of a long range, high altitude surface-to-air missile system. Air Force believes that Soviet requirements for such a system cannot be met by improvements of the SA-2, and that an entirely new system will be developed. The present text reflects the current views of GMAIC.

5. In addition to the expressed dissents, The Joint Staff is expected to recommend changes to two paragraphs. They believe that paragraph 28 (page 16) overstates the effectiveness of the Soviet radar network in the face of Western countermeasures. They plan to propose a substitute paragraph stating that the high density coverage of the



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Soviet radar system would be effective against jamming aircraft only if the Soviet equipment were properly employed. They also believe that the word "all" in the final sentence of paragraph [redacted] 107 indicates too great a capability on the part of the Soviets and would change this sentence to read: "In any event they almost certainly will not achieve assurance that they can deny anything like all vital targets to an attacking force." We recommend retention of the present draft in both cases.

6. In its final form, the estimate will also include a map depicting Soviet early warning capabilities which will not be available on Tuesday, 29 March. We recommend that USIB consideration of this map (as well as the detailed tables in Annex A) be delegated to a representatives meeting to be held later this week. At this meeting, too, oral contributions could be made to a validity study of NIE 11-57, and to a post mortem on the present estimate.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman



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